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United States, Canadian, and International
Refugee Law: A Critical Comparison
By RONALD C. SILBERSTEIN
Member of the Class of 1989
I. INTRODUCTION
Roberto G. was a teacher and union activist in El Salvador. Be-
cause of his work, the Salvadorian security forces twice kidnapped and
savagely beat him. After the second kidnapping, they imprisoned him
for thirty days. The security forces finally released him after nearly beat-
ing him to death and throwing acid over his body. He was left for dead
by the side of a road. Luckily, some friends found him and he later man-
aged to escape to the United States. While Roberto G. was in the United
States, Salvadorian security forces mistook Roberto's brother for Ro-
berto and killed him. His body was found decapitated and castrated.
The eyes had been gouged out. In January 1985 the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) denied Roberto's application for political
asylum and consequently ordered him deported within thirty days. De-
spite expert medical testimony which confirmed Roberto's torture, the
INS stated that under the statutory requirements, he had failed to prove
a sufficient probability of persecution because "kidnapping and other ex-
cesses [in El Salvador] are endured and perpetrated by all."1
The United States violates international law by deporting refugees,
such as Roberto G., to countries where they fear persecution. This Note
compares United States and Canadian requirements for granting asylum
to those requirements under the United Nations 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees (Protocol),2 the United Nations 1951 Conven-
1. Van Der Hout, The Politics of Asylum, 5 CAL. LAW. 72 (1985) (Van Der Hout dis-
cusses the disparate treatment of asylum claims between Eastern Block countries and Central
America.) Although Roberto G. might qualify for a discretionary grant of asylum as a result
of Cardoza-Fonseca, see infra note 51 and accompanying text, he still might not qualify for
mandatory withholding of deportation under present United States refugee law. His case also
exemplifies the nationality based discrimination that the INS continues to practice.
2. The United States and Canada are signatories of the Protocol. Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.LA.S. No. 6577,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
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tion Relating to the Status of Refugees (Conventio), 3 the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook (Handbook),4 and Canada's
New Refugee Status Advisory Committee Guidelines on Refugee Defini-
tion and Assessment of Credibility (Guidelines).5
Although the United States, Canada, and Article I of the Conven-
tion use the term "a well-founded fear of persecution" to define refugee
status, United States and Canadian refugee law differs in one major re-
spect. According to Canadian law, once a refugee demonstrates a well-
founded fear of persecution, that person has the right to remain in Can-
ada.6 Generally, this complies with the Protocol. United States law,
however, designates one class of refugees eligible for a discretionary grant
of asylum and another more limited class of refugees which has a statu-
tory right not to be deported to the country in which they fear persecu-
tion. This procedure does not comply with the spirit of the Protocol.
3. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention]. The United States never signed the Convention, but
neverless is bound to Articles 2-34 of the Convention through Article 1 of the Protocol. Proto-
col, supra note 2, at 267.
4. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND
THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (Geneva 1979) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK]. This handbook outlines international standards for determining refugee status,
5. NEw REFUGEE STATUS ADVISORY COMMITTEE GUIDELINES ON REFUGEE DEFINI-
TION AND ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY (Canada 1982) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The
GUIDELINES are used in Canada "together with the explanatory material set forth in the
UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ... [to]
assist Committee members in meeting both the legal requirement of our legislation and the
'spirit' of our international commitment to refugees." Id. 2. Thus, Canada uses the GUIDE-
LINES in conjunction with the HANDBOOK to guide its immigration officers and judges in de-
termining refugee status.
6. The days when the international community can look to Canada as a model for incor-
porating the Protocol into a country's domestic law may be over. 'On July 22, 1988, the Cana-
dian Governor General approved two bills, C-55 and C-84 which will severely modify and
restrict refugee determinations in Canada. 65 INTERPRETER RELEsES No. 30, at 785 (Aug. 8,
1988). These new laws will not go into force until they are officially "proclaimed" by the
Canadian Government. Id. at 786. The Canadian Government is not likely to proclaim these
new laws until January 1, 1989, which is after the Ministry of Employment and Immigration
completes drafting the implementing regulations and border enforcement procedures. Id.
The exact effect of Canada's legislation on the determination of refugee status in Canada
is uncertain because the new laws promise a host of constitutional challenges. Id. at 788. Even
in light of Canada's new legislation, a comparison of Canadian and United States approaches
to refugee law remains important for two reasons. First, the newly passed Canadian legislation
is primarily aimed at the process of determining refugee status and detention and deterrence
measures. Id. at 786, 788. This Note, however, compares the standards used by Canada and
the United States to determine refugee status. Second, this Note argues that Canada's Imple-
mentation of the Protocol, prior to the proclamation of its new laws serve as a valuable model
of refugee law that countries should emulate. This Note briefly assesses some of the likely
implications of Canada's new legislation in section VI.
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Sections II and HI of this Note explain the basics of United States
and Canadian refugee law, and section IV compares their laws. Section
V uses Canada as a model to demonstrate how the United States should
change its standard for refugee status and comply with its international
obligations. Finally, section VI briefly summarizes some of the likely im-
plications for refugees of recently passed Canadian legislation.
II. UNITED STATES REFUGEE LAW
A. Asylum
The term "asylum" is used when a host country grants residence to
people who have fled their native country or country of normal residence
and apply for asylum while inside the host country, rather than abroad at
the host country's consulate. The cause of the aliens' flight must be that
the people fear persecution in their native country or country of normal
residence on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group or political opinion.7
1. Statutory Definition
The 1980 Refugee Act states:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physi-
cally present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry,
irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien
may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the
Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the
meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.'
This statute has two main elements: 1) the applicant must be a refu-
gee and 2) the Attorney General, through a district director, has discre-
tionary power to grant asylum.9 United States Code section
1101(a)42(A) defines a "refugee" as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwill-
ing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
7. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1101(a)42(A) (1987). In the United States, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159(b) (1987) allows aliens who have been granted asylum to become permanent residents.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
9. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) (1986).
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 10
The district director shall deny asylum in his or her discretion if 1)
the refugee has been firmly resettled in a foreign country; 11 2) the refugee
has taken part in the persecution of any person on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular group or political opinion;12
3) the refugee has a serious criminal conviction or is a danger to the
community;13 4) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States; 4 5)
there are reasonable grounds to believe the alien is a danger to the secur-
ity of the United States15 or 6) there is an outstanding offer from a third
country where the alien will not face persecution, and the alien's resettle-
ment in a third country is in the public interest.", Many of the above
criteria, which disqualify a refugees from enjoying the protection of their
host country, are based on definitions found in the Protocol. 17
2. The Role of State Department Advisory Opinions in Asylum
Determinations
The Attorney General has not published any positive criteria for
granting asylum. Thus the district director may, in his or her discretion,
deny asylum even though an alien meets the statutory eligibility require-
ments for asylum." In practice, the district director's decision is based
on an advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs (BHRHA) in the Department of State. 19 These advisory
opinions give the district director information regarding the applicant
and the political conditions in the alien's country."0
10. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A).
11. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(ii).
12. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(iii).
13. 8 C.F.R § 208.8(f)(1)(iv).
14. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(v).
15. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(vi).
16. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(2).
17. The Protocol precedes 8 U.S.C. § lIla, a codification of the 1980 Refugee Act, by
thirteen years. The Protocol does not apply 1) to any person who has "acquired a new nation-
ality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality;" 2) to any person who
the district director seriously believes has "committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity;" or 3) to any person who "committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee." Convention,
supra note 3, at 154, 156 (compare with supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text).
18. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1986); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(d). See Note, Discrimination in Asylum
Law: The Implications of Jean v. Nelson, 62 IND. L.J. 127, 141-43 (1986) (authored by Mary
Jane Lapointe).
20. Note, supra note 19, at 141.
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The Department of State, itself a political institution, lacks the nec-
essary political objectivity to issue these opinions.2" Kasravi v. IN5S
strongly criticized the use of State Department opinions as unreliable evi-
dence?' because the State Department has a conflict of interest. The
State Department has a duty to maintain advantageous diplomatic rela-
tions with countries all over the world. On the other hand its advisory
opinions must give a "frank, but official, discussion of the political short-
comings of a friendly nation ... "24 Furthermore, the court pointed out,
"[t]he traditional foundation required of expert testimony is lacking: nor
can official position be said to supply an acceptable substitute.""5
BHRHA advisory opinions cannot discuss the "political shortcom-
ings" of nations with which we have military relations because of section
2304 of the Foreign Assistance Act.26 Section 2304(a)(2) of the Act pro-
hibits United States military aid to any country engaged in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.27
The Department of State must certify to Congress each year that nations
which receive military aid do not engage in gross violations of human
rights.2" Most asylum applicants from countries such as El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras allege violations of their human rights.39
However, if BHRHA advisory opinions were to acknowledge that gross
violations of human rights do occur in those countries, then the Depart-
ment of State would be conceding that military aid to those countries
violates section 2304. In fact, if the Department of State were to ac-
knowledge gross human rights violations in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala, it would be making findings contrary to a long standing for-
eign policy of supplying military aid to those countries.30
A comparison by nationality of the figures for asylum applications
with the percent of accepted applications exposes the Department of
State's discriminatory politics. Of the total number of asylum applica-
21. Id. at 143.
22. 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
23. Id. at 677 & 677 n.1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1987). See also supra note 1.
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2).
28. Van Der Hout, supra note 1, at 72.
29. Id.
30. Id. Another example of this long standing foreign policy is United States-Guatermnlan
relations. The United States has backed the military in Guatemala since 1954. That year the
Central Intelligence Agency backed a coup which ousted the elected government of 3acobo
Arbenz-Guzman and installed a military regime. Miller, Guatemalan President's Struggle
With the Army, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 20, 1988, at A13, col. 1.
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tions from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union hi 1986, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) granted 53.6 percent.31 Likewise,
in 1986 the INS granted 64.3 percent of the applications from China.32
In Central America, however, the figures present a different picture. Of
all asylum applications from El Salvador, Guatem;fla, and Honduras in
1986, the INS granted 4.6 percent, 2.3 percent, and zero percent 33 re-
spectively. In contrast, the INA granted 27.4 percent of refugee applica-
tions from Nicaragua.34
The disparate treatment resulting from the grant or denial of asylum
applications based on BHRHA advisory opinions violates not only the
international norms, as defined by the Handbook,3" but also the nondis-
criminatory requirements articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Jean v. Nelson.36
The Handbook states that the duty to ascertain and evaluate an ap-
plicant's claim may require the "examiner to use all the means at his
disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the applica-
31. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: Asylum applications granted: 591; denied: 511;
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1986 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 49 (1987) [hereinafter
I.N.S. YEARBOOK].
32. China: Asylum applications granted: 18; denied: 10. Id.
33. El Salvador: Asylum applications granted: 55; denied: 1,149. Guatemala: Asylum ap.
plications granted: 5; denied: 209. Honduras: Asylum applications granted: 0; denied: 28. Id.
34. Nicaragua: Asylum applications granted: 1,082; denied: 2,873. Id. The asylum appli-
cation approval rate in 1986 for Nicaraguan asylum applications is comparable to the 1986
approval rate for all nationalities. All nationalities: Asylum applications granted: 3,359; de-
nied: 7,882; approval rate: 29.9%. Id. at 48. On July 8, 1987, Attorney General Edwin Meese
III announced a new immigration policy for Nicaraguans. 64 INERPRETER RELEASES No.
30, at 920 (Aug. 10, 1987). Among other things, the Attorney General directed the I.N.S,
district directors 1) not to deport any Nicaraguan who has a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion," unless the refugee is a criminal or a danger to the national security; 2) to grant work
authorization to every Nicaraguan entitled to it, and to expedite Nicaraguan applications for
work authorizations; 3) "[to encourage Nicaraguans whose claims for asylum or withholding
of deportation have been denied to reapply for reopening or rehearing of such claims;" and 4)
to "encourage and educate Nicaraguans who may be eligible for legalization under the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act to apply." Id. While the Attorney General claims the order
is only to insure cases are reopened in light of Cardoza-Fonseca, I.N.S. District Director in
Miami, Perry Rifkin, says that the order will mean a "much more liberal interpretation of the
asylum claim." Id. at 922 (citing N.Y. Times, July 9, 1987, at AS, col. 1). In response Rep.
Joe Moakley (D-MA) stated: "The Reagan administration is playing politics with people's
lives.... To ignore any mention of El Salvador is to turn a cold and callous shoulder on
refugees who have fled a violent civil war." Id. In the first six months of 1987 the I.N.S.
granted 1,028 Nicaraguan asylum applications and denied 186. This is an approval rate of
84.6%. I.N.S. YEARBOOK, supra note 31, at 99.
35. Note, supra note 19, at 144.
36. Statutes or regulations which are neutral on their face must be applied neutrally. 472
U.S. 846, 856-57 (1985). See also Note, supra note 19, at 144.
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tion."'37 While the Department of State is one source of information, the
district director should also consider information acquired from other
international human rights organizations, community groups which as-
sist refugees, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Decisions based on BHRHA advisory opinions alone are not individual-
ized determinations without regard to race or national origin,38 as re-
quired under both Jean v. Nelson and Article 3 of the Convention. 39
3. Alien's Burden of Proof for Asylum Eligibility: "A Well-
Founded Fear of Persecution"
An alien must prove both the subjective intent and the objective rea-
sonableness which create a well-founded fear of persecution.40 The
Supreme Court has directed judicial attention to focus on the individual's
subjective belief.4 ' Aliens prove the subjective element if their fear is
genuine.42 However, the courts judge the subjective state of fear by what
a reasonable person under the same circumstances as the alien would feel
if that person were deported to the alien's native country.43 It is not
enough that most people would be afraid in the alien's situation; the
aliens must honestly be afraid of their situation. Credible testimony of
the applicant's genuine fear might suffice when conditions in the alien's
native country make production of documentary evidence difficult or
impossible.14
In Carcamo-Flores v. INS,45 Juan Carcamo-Flores requested asy-
lum. He testified that as a result of his labor activities and his relation-
ship to his assassinated father, he might be targeted for persecution or
even murder by "death squads" in El Salvador. From a practical per-
spective, it would have been almost impossible for Juan Carcamo-Flores
to prove that he was on a "death list" unless he could meet the burden of
37. HANDBOOK, supra note 4 196.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A) is neutral on its face. Thus, according to Jean v. Nelson it
should be applied neutrally.
39. Article 3 of the Convention states: 'The Contracting States shall apply the provisions
of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin."
Convention, supra note 3, at 156.
40. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 425, 431 (1987).
41. Id. at 431.
42. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985).
43. Id. However, if the alien's fear is based on conditions of discrimination rather than
persecution, asylum will not be granted. See Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of why racial discrimination can
be paramount to "persecution on account of race" under the HANDBOOK criteria.
44. Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
45. Id. at 62.
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proof through credible testimony. The court held that his testimony
alone could meet the burden of proof used for a well-founded fear of
persecution.' The court remanded the case to be considered in this
light.
The objective element of a well-founded fear is the circumstance
under which applicants develop their fears. This fear must have some
grounding in objective reality.47 The objective component may be
proved by affidavits, journalistic accounts of other examples of persecu-
tion in the country involved or testimony corroborating the alien's
claim.4" These examples of persecution offer insight into the conditions
in the alien's country, its laws, and the experience of others. With these
examples in mind, the adjudicator is in a better position to both under-
stand whether applicants' fears are genuine and whether their testimony
is credible.49
Aliens need not produce a particular amount or kind of evidence to
demonstrate that their fear is objectively well-founded, if the alien is
credible and conditions in that person's native country make it practi-
cally impossible to obtain objective evidence.5" In INS v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca,51 the Supreme Court limited the probability of persecution that a
court may require from an applicant seeking to establish a well-founded
fear of persecution. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court held that an alien
need not prove it is more likely than not (a greater than fifty percent
probability) that they will be persecuted in their home country.52 The
Court gave the following illustration:
Let us... presume that it is known that in the applicant's country of
origin every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to
some remote labor camp .... In such a case it would be only too
apparent that anyone who has managed to escape from the country in
question will have 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' upon his [or
her] eventual return. 3
In In re Mogharrabi,54 the Board of Immigration Appeals responded
to Cardoza-Fonseca's holding that a well-founded fear of persecution is
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 n.II (9th Cir. 1984).
50. 805 F.2d at 64.
51. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
52. 480 U.S. at 449.
53. 480 U.S. at 431 (quoting A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUs OF REFUGEES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 180 (1966)).
54. Interim Decision 3028 (BIA)(June 12, 1987).
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substantially different and requires a lesser probability of persecution
than a "clear probability of persecution."55 In addition to the burden of
proof established in Cardoza-Fonseca, In re Mogharrabi requires the evi-
dence to establish that:
(1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to
overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the per-
secutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien
possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capa-
bility of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination
to punish the alien.56
The Board of Immigration Appeals in In re Mogharrabi also re-
quires applicants to be specific in their claims, to demonstrate a reason-
able possibility of persecution, and to prove that they have a good reason
to fear persecution. 57
4. Conclusion Regarding United States Asylum Law
The clear intent of United States asylum law is to conform with the
Protocol.5 8 This intent is evidenced in the Senate report on the 1980
Immigration and Nationality Act which stated that the 1980 Refugee
Act will bring United States law into conformity with its international
treaty obligations under the Protocol and the Convention. 9 The courts
are bound by United States treaty obligations such as the Protocol.'
Furthermore, the courts constantly refer to the Protocol, the Conven-
tion, and the Handbook when interpreting United States refugee law.61
The Supreme Court observes, however, that United Nations publications
that solely give guidance on treaty compliance, such as the Handbook, do
not have the "force of law."'62
United States asylum law complies with the basic asylum objectives
of the Protocol by incorporating the Protocol's definition of refugee into
55. An alien who proves a "clear probability of persecution" has a right to mandatory,
country specific withholding of deportation. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
56. In re Mogharrabi, Interim Decision 3028 (BIA) B1-128-29 (June 12, 1987).
57. Id. at BI-126.
58. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEWS 141, 144.
59. Id.
60. U.S. CONST. art m, § 2. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987).
61. Three recent examples are Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,429,432-43,449; Turcios
v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987); and In re Mogharrabi, Interim Decision
3028 (BIA) B1-128 (June 12, 1987).
62. 480 U.S. at 439 n.22.
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United States law63 and by offering the possibility of adjusting the refu-
gee's status to that of a legal permanent resident."r The district director,
however, jeopardizes the fairness of the procedure when he or she bases
the discretionary granting or denial of asylum on BHRHA advisory
opinions. Prejudice exists as long as asylum decisions continue to be
based on politically partisan opinions. Many criticize the process of
granting asylum for its disparate treatment of refugees from countries
that the United States supports politically and those that it does not.6 5
This practice violates both the Protocol and the requirements dictated by
the Supreme Court. 6
The burden of proof requirements for demonstrating a well-founded
fear of persecution in the United States are similar, though not identical,
to those in the Handbook. The Handbook and the United States each
require the applicant's fear to be genuine. Both consider the circum-
stances in the alien's country when assessing the credibility of the appli-
cant's fear.67 The Handbook recognizes the difficulty of offering
documentation or other proof when it states that the "cases in which an
applicant can provide evidence of all his statements will be the exception
rather than the rule."68 Although the United States basically follows the
Handbook's subjective and objective element guidelines, it fails to grant
asylum in a fair manner.69
63. Compare the definition of refugee in the Convention with the Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). Article I of the Convention states:
Mhe term "refugee" shall apply to any person who ... owing to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his for-
mer habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.
Convention, supra note 3, at 152. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1987) for the United States
statutory definition of a refugee.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1987) attempts to fulfill United States obligations under the Proto-
col which through Article 34 of the Convention states: "The Contracting States shall as far as
possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular
make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings...." Convention, supra note 3, at
176.
65. See Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 865 (1982)
and Note, supra note 19, at 141-43.
66. See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
67. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, %% 37-43.
68. Id. 1196.
69. Convention, supra note 3, at 156.
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B. "Country Specific" Withholding of Deportation
In some cases, the probability that aliens will be persecuted if re-
turned to their country of origin is so high that the Attorney General
cannot deport aliens to that country.70 This is called country specific
withholding of deportation because if the Attorney General fails to grant
the alien asylum, the Attorney General could still deport the alien to a
third country willing to accept him or her.
1. Statutory Definition
The 1980 Refugee Act states: "The Attorney General shall not de-
port or return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion.
71
The statute has three main elements. First, withholding of deporta-
tion is mandatory if the applicant meets the burden of proof for the statu-
tory definition under Title 8 U.S.C. section 1253(h). Second,
withholding of deportation is country specific. This means that the At-
torney General (through the district director) may still deport the alien,
but not to the country where that person's life or freedom would be
threatened. Third, withholding of deportation refugee status is granted
only if the alien would be persecuted on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1987).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1). Section 1253(h)(1) is subject to the following exceptions:
(2) Paragraph(l) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines
that-
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecu-
tion of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a
serious non political crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the
alien in the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the se-
curity of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1987). Note that these statutory exceptions to the withholding of de-
portation are identical in language to the criteria requiring the district director to deny an
application for asylum. See supra notes 11-16.
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2. The Burden of Proof Required for Country Specific
Withholding of Deportation
The Supreme Court requires an alien to establish a "clear
probability of persecution" to avoid deportation. 72 A clear probability of
persecution means that if the alien is deported to the country in question,
the probability of persecution is greater than fifty percent ("more likely
than not"). 73 The threat to the individual must be serious in nature and
likely to be carried out.74 In earlier cases the same court required appli-
cants for country specific withholding of deportation to substantiate their
claim of persecution with "factual support," "concrete evidence" or
"documentary evidence."75 However, direct corroboration of specific
threats is unnecessary because such a stringent burden of proof would
result in the deportation of people whose lives are genuinely in jeop-
ardy.76 In Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,7 7 the court recognized that au-
thentic refugees can rarely present direct corroboration of specific threats
because the persecutors "are hardly likely to provide their victims with
affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution."7 " The court, however,
continued by stating, "the mere fact that a threat was made may not be
sufficient to establish a clear probability of persecution.... What really
matters is whether the group making the threat has the will to carry it
out. It is here that.., evidence, such as documentary evidence, may be
most useful.
' 79
Although the court in Bolanos-Hernandez recognizes that refugees
are rarely able to corroborate their stories of threats and fear with hard
evidence, it still requires that specific threats are documented with some
evidence.8" Consequently, the burden of proof for withholding of depor-
tation is so onerous that it is very difficult for most refugees to succeed in
their request for country specific withholding of deportation.
Dally v. INS"1 exemplifies the excessive hardship created by the bur-
den of proof for the country specific withholding of deportation. The
applicants, husband and wife, were Chaldean Catholics from Iraq. The
government repeatedly harassed both them and their family for refusing
72. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984).
73. Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191, 1195 (6th Cir. 1984).
74. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1984).
75. Id. at 1284.
76. Id. at 1285.
77. Id. at 1277.
78. Id. at 1285.
79. Id. at 1285-86.
80. Id. at 1284-86.
81. 744 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1984).
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to join the Baath Party. Members of the Baath Party detained the hus-
band and then physically abused and interrogated him for refusing to
join. Shortly thereafter, he was discharged from his employment as a
delivery man, a job he had held for seventeen years. His sister was seized
and interrogated by the Iraqi secret police on several occasions for her
failure to join the Baath Party. The police also coerced his oldest daugh-
ter to join the Party by threatening to jail her father. Finally, he had
difficulty running his liquor business and was able to obtain a passport
only after bribing an Iraqi officer. Although the court did not question
the sincerity of his allegations and recognized the "difficulties petitioners
like Khamou [the husband] and their counsel confront in substantiating
their claims of persecution," 82 the court held that the newspaper articles
and pamphlets he used to corroborate his testimony were not sufficient to
grant him mandatory, country specific withholding of deportation.83
A recent case, however, suggests some modification of the clear
probability burden of proof and the requirement that applicants, such as
Khamou Dally, substantiate their specific claims of persecution with cor-
roborative evidence. In Turcios v. INS,84 Hugo Turcios testified in great
detail about his arrest, torture, confinement, and release. The immigra-
tion judge denied his application for a lack of evidence corroborating his
testimony. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Turcios held that applicants might not be required to substantiate their
claims with corroborative evidence in all cases.8 5 The court, in part
quoting Bolanos-Hernandez, stated that authentic refugees can rarely of-
fer direct corroboration of specific threats or specific incidents of persecu-
tion. It concluded that if Turcios' testimony was credible, it was not
insufficient for lack of corroboration, and that Turcios had demonstrated
a clear probability of persecution.86
This opinion may signal a modification of the rule requiring corrob-
orative evidence in certain circumstances for country specific withhold-
ing of deportation. However, the decision left untouched the
requirement that applicants prove by a clear probability that they would
be persecuted and not simply that they possess a well-founded fear of
persecution, as is done for asylum applicants.
Congress intended the standard for asylum (a well-founded fear of
persecution) to be significantly different from the standard for
82. Id. at 1197.
83. Id.
84. 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 1402.
86. Id.
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mandatory, country specific withholding of deportation (a clear
probability of persecution). 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that Con-
gress intended to make it more difficult to establish an absolute right to
withholding of deportation than to establish mere eligibility for asylum.88
3. Conclusion Regarding Mandatory "Country Specific"
Withholding of Deportation
The intent of United States withholding of deportation law is to con-
form to the Protocol by requiring country specific withholding of depor-
tation in cases where the alien's life or freedom would be threatened8 9
United States statutory language for country specific withholding of de-
portation embodies the language of Article 33 of the Convention. 90
However, nowhere in the Protocol, the Convention or the Handbook are
two classes of refugees defined as they are in the United States.
The Handbook requires a refugee to establish a well-founded fear of
persecution and this fear must be reasonable considering the situation in
the applicant's native country or country of normal residence.91 Further-
more, "[t]he word 'fear' refers.., to those who wish to avoid a situation
entailing the risk of persecution."92
United States law does not conform to the Handbook's definition of
a refugee. The United States treats withholding of deportation as a sepa-
rate class of refugees and requires such a refugee to prove a clear
probability of persecution rather than a well-founded fear of persecution.
Article 33 of the Convention prohibits the expulsion or return of
refugees to any place where either their life or freedom would be
87. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 n.31 (1987).
88. 480 U.S. at 449-50.
89. I.N.S. v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984). Since both 8 U.S.C. § 1243(h) and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) are from the Refugee Act of 1980, the intent for their inclusion in the Act is the
same: to conform United States refugee law to United States international obligations under
the Protocol. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
90. Compare supra note 71 and accompanying text with Article 33 which states,
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a partic-
ularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the country.
Convention, supra note 3, at 176.
91. HANDBOOK, supra note 4 1 37-38, 40-43.
92. Id. 45.
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threatened.93 This policy of nonrefoulement cannot be interpreted to al-
low the creation of a distinct refugee class guaranteeing protection only
to those who can prove that their life or freedom would be threatened.
Article 33 recognizes that host countries can deport certain refugees and
deny them permanent asylum. In the context of the entire Protocol,
however, the host country cannot deport refugees to the country they
fled unless the refugee falls into one of the exceptions provided for in
Article 33. The Protocol does not contemplate that simply because refutI
gees are unable to prove a clear probability of persecution, the host coun-
try will deport refugees to the country in which they have a well-founded
fear of being persecuted. Read with the other articles, Article 33 requires
signatories to find a safe country for a refugee whom the signatory coun-
try does not wish to nationalize. This duty is explicit since the Protocol,
through Article 31(2) of the Convention, requires the signatories to do all
that is necessary to gain the refugee admission into another country.
Deporting aliens to countries in which they fear persecution clearly vio-
lates this requirement.
If Article 33 were meant to create two separate refugee classes, then
it and the Handbook would have defined separate standards for "a well-
founded fear of persecution" (asylum claims) and "would be threatened"
(similar to the clear probability standard which the United States re-
quires for withholding of deportation claims). However, the Protocol
and the Handbook define only one class of refugees and use a well-
founded fear of persecution as the only standard. The entire Handbook
is devoted to defining the burden of proof applicants must meet in order
to have a well-founded fear of persecution. Yet nowhere does it say that
there is a stricter burden of proof for refugee status under Article 33 than
for the other rights refugees have under the other Protocol articles. The
United States provides for withholding of deportation as mandated by
the Protocol but places this protection out of the reach of most refugees
by imposing a stricter burden of proof than that intended by the treaty.
United States country specific deportation law also fails to comply
with Articles 31(2) and 34 of the Convention. The United States deports
refugees who are denied asylum and unable to satisfy the more onerous
burden of proof required for country specific withholding of deportation.
In contrast, Article 31(2) requires signatories to furnish refugees denied
asylum a reasonable time and all the necessary facilities to gain admis-
sion into another country.95 Similarly Article 34 states: "The Con-
93. Convention, supra note 3, at 176.
94. Id. at 174.
95. Id.
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tracting States shall as far as possible facilitate [and expedite] the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees."96
III. CANADIAN REFUGEE LAW
A. Asylum
Unlike the United States, Canada has no separate statutory classifi-
cation for asylum and country specific withholding of deportation. Be-
cause Canada follows a common law system, its asylum law is based on
both statutory and case law.
1. Statutory Definition
The 1976 Immigration Act of Canada provides: "[A] Convention
refugee... [has] a right to remain in Canada" 97 except when that person
1) is convicted of a serious offence,98 2) is or may be a spy, subversive99 or
a terrorist,"° 3) is a person convicted in Canada of an offence for which a
term of imprisonment often years or more may be imposed'0 1 or 4) "has
been convicted of an offense under any Act of Parliament for which a
term of imprisonment of (i) more than six months has been imposed, or
(ii) five years or more may be imposed."'"
Some of these exclusions allow the Canadian government to manip-
ulate refugees for political reasons. 103 The exclusions allow persons con-
victed of a political offense in their country to be excluded if the
Canadian government claims they are a danger to the public. This is also
true under the exclusions in Canada's new immigration legislation, C-
55.14 The term "subversive" is ambiguous. In C-55 it includes not only
those who, with or without force, subvert a democratic government but
also those who use force to subvert a nondemocratic government.10 5
This implies that someone who opposes a particular government classi-
96. Id. at 176.
97. F.N. MARROcco, Q.C. & H.M. GOSLETT, ThE ANNOTArED IMMIGRATION ACT ov
CANADA § 4(2) (1984) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AcT]. For a definition of "Convention ref-
ugee," see § 2(1).
98. Id. § 19(1)(c).
99. Id. §§ 19(1)(e)-(f), 27(I)(c), 27(2)(c).
100. Id. § 19(l)(g).
101. Id. § 55(c).
102. Id. §§ 4(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
103. The Protocol allows countries to exclude refugees only if they engaged in war crimes
or serious nonpolitical crimes prior to seeking admission. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
104. See supra note 6, at 786.
105. Id. at 786-87.
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fled by Canada as "democratic," may be labeled a subversive. Also, any-
one who engages in armed struggles against fascist or military
governments could be classified as subversive. As a result of this exclu-
sion provision, revolutionaries and people demanding change of a demo-
cratic government will encounter more obstacles than other refugees
when they apply for refugee status. Lastly, if the Government believes it
would be against the public interest for the alien to claim refugee status it
may choose not to recognize that person as a refugee. °6 This too allows
for political manipulation at the refugee's expense. For example, the ref-
ugee committee recently found a claimant from India to be a refugee.
The Minister of External Affairs, however, decided not to recognize the
person as a Convention refugee because such recognition might have dis-
rupted trade and other relations with India."°7
Barring these exceptions, "[w]here an adjudicator determines that a
Convention refugee is a Convention refugee described in subsection 4(2),
he shall ...allow that person to remain in Canada."' 08 Even if the
Convention refugee falls into one or more of the above exceptions, the
Minister of Employment and Immigration may nonetheless use his or
her discretion to allow the refugee to remain in Canada °9
Thus, a Convention refugee generally has the right to remain in
Canada. 1 ' Furthermore, Convention refugees who are not criminals or
subversives, but are subject to removal'11 for some other reason, cannot
be removed to a country where the refugees' lives would be threatened on
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion.11 2
106. Id. at 787.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 47(3).
109. Id. § 55.
110. Id. § 47(3).
111. The reason might be that the person has already been admitted to a third country as a
refugee and can safely return to that country. Boun-Leun v. Min. of Manpower & Immigra-
tion, [1981] 1 F.C. 259 (C.A.).
112. IMMIGRATION AcT, supra note 97 § 55.
Section 55 poses the following question. If a refugee has a right to remain in
Canada, how can the issue of his deportation arise? The answer is that Section 47(3)
[See supra note 108 and accompanying text] deals with refugees, and Section 55 deals
with deportation orders against persons generally. Section 55 also provides for the
case where a deportation order has been made on the grounds provided for in the
Immigration Act, and that person is also a refugee. In that case the deportation
order cannot send the refugee to a country where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened unless the refugee is also a criminal or a subversive.
Letter from Brian A. Kelsey, Q.C. to Ron Silberstein (Aug. 31, 1987) (discussing the ImJftI-
GRATION AcT).
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The 1976 Immigration Act of Canada Provides that "[t]he term
'Convention' in the expression 'Convention refugee' refers to the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees signed at Geneva
on the 28th day of July, 1951 and includes the Protocol thereto signed at
New York on the 31st day of January, 1967. ''1I3
Section 2(1) provides:
"Convention refugee" means any person who, by reason of a well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, (a) is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, by reason of
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that coun-
try, or (b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country
of his former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of such
fear, is unwilling to return to that country.1 14
1. Canadian Burden of Proof for a Convention Refugee
Canada assesses the subjective element of a well-founded fear of per-
secution with objective criteria.115 There are both subjective and objec-
tive elements in the assessment of a well-founded fear of persecution,
because the refugee "may as a subjective matter fear persecution if he is
returned to his homeland, but his fear must be assessed objectively in
order to determine if there is a foundation for it."' I5 If an applicant fears
persecution for his political activities, its significance must be viewed ob-
jectively, not as someone in Canada would view those acts but rather as
they would be viewed in the country where they occurred. 17
The burden of proof is placed on the alien to prove a subjective fear
exists." 8 The courts recognize that this is a very difficult task. Therefore
the rules of production of evidence used in ordinary cases do not ap-
ply." 9 Because the refugee need not follow the ordinary rules of evi-
dence, "[w]hen the application of the refugee definition to a claimant is in
doubt, the claimant will receive the benefit of the doubt."' 20
Although Canadian refugee law gives the applicant's statements the
benefit of the doubt, an alien who has a "mere apprehension" of persecu-
113. IMMIGRATION Acr, supra note 97 § 2(2).
114. Id. § 2(l).
115. Kwiatkowsky v. ME1, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 856, 862.
116. Id. at 862.
117. Jerez-Spring v. LAB, [1981] 2 F.C. 527, 528. See also, Astudillo v. MEl, [1979] 31
N.R. 121, 122.
118. Re Mingot, [1973] 8 IAC 351, 356.
119. Id. at 356.
120. See GUIDELINES, supra note 5 1 3. See also, Re Mingot, [1973] 8 JAC at 356.
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tion does not satisfy the burden of proof for a well-founded fear of perse-
cution.' 2 1 For example in Re Iyar' " the applicant, Tharoshuni Iyar, was
an Indian living in South Africa. Although she was subject to racial bias
because of her Indian race and had a "feeling of unease," the Immigra-
tion Appeals Board (AB) held that if indeed she had a fear, it was not
well-founded.' 2 Further, they held, she was never persecuted on ac-
count of her Indian origin since she was not denied access to education
or employment.' 4 Although she was segregated and not allowed to
vote, the IAB felt that this was discrimination and not persecution be-
cause she could not point to any incident when she or her family was
persecuted.'25 The IAB also doubted her credibility because before com-
ing to Canada, she visited many Western European countries without
claiming refugee status.126
In contrast to the apprehension felt by Tharoshuni Iyar, in
Bahamondes-Peralta v. ME112 7 the applicant was a Chilean citizen who
was subjected to continued physical harassment following the 1973 mili-
tary coup. The IAB determined that he had more than an apprehension
and was actually persecuted on account of his political activities.1z8 The
difference between the two cases is that by law Tharoshuni Iyar was de-
prived of the right to vote and freedom of movement but was not physi-
cally persecuted, whereas Moise Bahamondes-Peralta was physically
harassed and personally victimized for his political beliefs.
The credibility of the applicant's statement is crucial to the objective
assessment of the applicant's fear.12 9 The Guidelines state: "An applicant
who swears to certain allegations will be presumed to be telling the
truth."1 0 If there is an inconsistency in the claim but it is not a material
one, and if the claim would be well-founded apart from that inconsis-
tency, then refugee status should be granted.13' If the applicant makes a
material claim but it is not believed, the person may still be a refugee.13 2
Even when an applicant admits lying, this may not preclude refugee
121. Re Iyar, No. 79-1237 (lAB 1/15/80).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. No. 79-1082 (LAB 12/12/79).
128. Id.
129. GUIDELINEs, supra note 5, 15-18.
130. Id. 15.
131. Id. 16.
132. Id. 18(d).
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
status.1 3 3 In Nunez-Veloso v. ME1 134 the applicant, a Chilean citizen,
first testified that he had obtained a valid passport. He later testified that
he obtained the passport by fraud. Although he contradicted his earlier
testimony, he qualified as a Convention refugee because his testimony
was done in a "coherent, plausible, and credible manner."' 135
Credibility may be supported by corroborative evidence of the appli-
cant's testimony. In Garcia-Zavala v. ME1136 the applicant, a citizen of
Peru, claimed to be a refugee by reason of his membership in a social
group. A witness who had lived in Peru for ten years corroborated the
applicant's testimony of detention and torture. The witness testified that
the applicant was still listed with the Peruvian security as a wanted man.
Thus the LAB classified the applicant as a Convention refugee.13 7
Newspaper articles may also corroborate "a well-founded fear of
-persecution." In Re Saddo,'38 the court held that newspaper articles
must be weighed along with other elements of proof submitted in support
of the applicants claim. 13 9
The applicant must show past persecution or have "good reason" to
fear future persecution to meet the objective requirement. In Re
Srikanthan,'4 the applicant's credibility was questionable. Further-
more, he was only marginally involved in political events in his country.
However, events that ensued after his departure led the court to believe
that he might encounter problems should he return to his native Sri
Lanka.141 Because he had good reason to fear future persecution, he
qualified as a Convention refugee. 142
Proof of a good reason to fear persecution does not mean that appli-
cants must show that they fear persecution as individuals. 141 Persecution
can be in the guise of indiscriminate terror."44 The Guidelines state that
a "person is a refugee whether he is persecuted alone, or persecuted with
others. A person need not be singled out for persecution in order to be a
refugee."145
133. Id.
134. Nos. 79-1017 and 79-1017-A (lAB 8/23/79).
135. Id.
136. No. 81-1222 (JAB 6/29/82).
137. Id.
138. [1981] 126 D.L.R. 3d 764.
139. Id. at 766.
140. No. T83-10351 (AB 5/23/85).
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. GUIDELINES, supra note 5, 1 8-9.
144. Id. 8.
145. Id. 9.
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In Askale Asnake v. MEI,'1 the applicant was never singled out for
persecution nor persecuted for her political opinions.47 She did, how-
ever, qualify as a Convention refugee because her father was engaged in
open rebellion against the ruling regime. Although it may seem that her
fear was for her father rather than herself, the court held that her fear of
being returned to Ethiopia was well-founded.14
To be Convention refugees, applicants do not have to prove that
they would be persecuted if returned to their native country. 49 In Re
Srikanthan and MEI,150 the court held:
[Wn order to support a finding that an applicant is a Convention refu-
gee, the evidence must not necessarily show that he "has suffered or
would suffer persecution"; what the evidence must show is that the
applicant has good grounds for fearing persecution for one of the rea-
sons specified in the Act. 5s
The Guidelines state: "The refugee definition is concerned with pos-
sibilities and probabilities rather than with certainties." ' The refugee
does not have to be "under the threat of imminent persecution." 1 53 Ap-
plicants need only show that they will possibly suffer persecution.'
2. Conclusion Regarding Convention Refugee Status
By defining a Convention refugee with reference to the Convention
and the Protocol, ' and by expressing the fulfillment of "Canada's in-
ternational legal obligations with respect to refugees" as a statutory ob-
jective,156 Canada clearly incorporates the principles of the Protocol into
its legal definition of a refugee. In addition, the Guidelines specifically
recommend that Canadian immigration officials use the Handbook to de-
termine refugee status.'
57
146. No. 80-1020 (lAB 2/23/81).
147. Id.
148. Id. If the Canadian court claims that she is a subversive, she might run into problems
due to her father's activities. In that case, Canada could deport her under § 55 of the Immi-
gration Act. IMMIGRATION Acr, supra note 97 § 55.
149. Re Naredo and Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1981] 130 D.L.L 3d 752,
753.
150. No. T83-10351 (IAB 5/23/85).
151. Id. at 5 (quoting Seifu, Eshetu, and LAB (F.C.A., no. A-277-82), Pratte, Le Dain,
Hyde, 12 Jan., 1983).
152. GUIDELINES, supra note 5, 14.
153. Id.
154. Id. 11.
155. IMMIGRATION AcT, supra note 97 § 2(1).
156. Id. § 3(g).
157. GurDFLNEs, supra note 5, 2.
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The burden of proof requirements for being a Convention refugee
virtually mirror the requirements set forth in the Handbook. Both Can-
ada and the Handbook take identical positions on objective and subjec-
tive elements,' 58  the benefit of the doubt,"5 9 credibility," 0  and
corroborative evidence. 6 In addition, both agree that individuals need
not demonstrate they are singled out to prove a risk of persecution.1 62
Finally, the legal standard which Canada uses for defining a Con-
vention refugee complies with the intent of the Protocol because its defi-
nition guarantees any Convention refugee in Canada the right to remain
there.'63 Furthermore, unless they are criminals or subversives, refugees
will not be deported on other grounds to the country in which they fear
persecution.' Canada's unitary definition of Convention refugee helps
prohibit the expulsion of refugees, facilitates the assimilation and natu-
ralization of refugees, and generally complies with Articles 3, 33, and 34
of the Convention. 65 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees awarded Canada the Nansen Medal in 1986 in recognition for its
refugee law.1 66
a. Problems With Canadian Refugee Law
Canadian refugee law does contain contradictions. The Canadian
government can manipulate the exclusion provisions to keep out political
undesirables who are genuine refugees. This may violate the Protocol
which only allows exclusion of refugees for nonpolitical crimes.167
Second, in Re Iyar, the IAB erred by distinguishing institutional-
ized, racial discrimination (apartheid) from persecution. The Handbook
recognizes that not all discrimination is persecution.1 68 However, "[tihe
laws of the country of origin, and particularly the manner in which they
158. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
163. IMMIGRATION Acr, supra note 97 §§ 4(2), 47(3).
164. Id. § 55.
165. See supra note 39 (for the text of Article 3). See supra note 90 (for the text of Article
33). Article 34 states: "The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees" Convention, supra note 3, at 176.
166. CANADIAN MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION, FOR RELEASE, 87-15,
NEW REFUGEE DETERMINATION LEGISLATION BACKGROUNDER D, CANADA'S COMMIT-
MENT TO REFUGEES 2 (1987).
167. See supra note 17.
168. HANDBOOK, supra note 4 1 53.
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are applied, will be relevant" '169 in determining whether persecution has
taken place. Additionally, it is possible to make a "'group determina-
tion' of refugee status, whereby each member of the group is regarded
prima facie ... as a refugee." 170 Together, discrimination along with
other factors that create an atmosphere of insecurity, can justify a well-
founded fear of persecution on cumulative grounds.17 1 The Handbook
concludes that "in certain circumstancs ... discrimination will amount
to persecution... if measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a
substantially prejudicial nature for the person[s] concerned." 17 The
Handbook equates "prejudicial nature" with serious restrictions placed
on employment, religious, and educational freedoms. 173 Although non-
whites may not suffer any religious restrictions, apartheid seriously re-
stricts work and educational opportunities.
The institution of apartheid, or "discrimination" as the IAB calls it,
does not stop with making loathsome racial distinctions based on irra-
tional suspicion and hatred. It causes detriment and injury to nonwhite
people. To persecute means "[t]o oppress or harass with ill-treatment"
or "[t]o annoy persistently; bother."174 An institution of prejudice that
treats individuals unequally, leaves a majority of its citizens with no right
to vote, and persistently oppresses people because of their race, unequivo-
cally meets the definition of "persecution on account of race." Whether
an institution or a specific individual causes the persecution, the anguish
endured by the individual is the same. Re Iyar implies that Canada does
not want to accept the practical consequences that would arise from
characterizing nonwhite South Africans who arrive in North America as
refugees.
IV. COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AND
CANADIAN REFUGEE LAW
A. Asylum and Withholding of Deportation
Canada and the United States use the same definition of a refugee.171
Both countries also employ the Handbook's definitions of and burden of
169. Id. 43.
170. Id. 44.
171. Id. 53.
172. Id. 54.
173. Id.
174. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 25 (2nd ed.
1976).
175. Compare supra note 10 and accompanying text with supra note 114 and accompanying
text.
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proof for a well-founded fear of persecution. Both countries focus on the
applicant's subjective state of mind. 176 Using credible testimony, appli-
cants must prove their fears are genuine and when possible, evidence may
be introduced of the applicant's situation to corroborate this fear. 17 7
Canada and the United States committed themselves to granting
asylum in a nondiscriminatory manner when they signed the Protocol.
Canada comes closer to achieving this goal by granting asylum to quali-
fied applicants (they can not be criminals or subversives) based on the
single standard of a Convention refugee. Although both countries can
manipulate the class of refugees granted asylum through their respective
exclusion provisions, 17 the United States fails to use nondiscriminatory
criteria when adjudicating nonexcludable refugee applicants' claims. In-
stead, the United States relies on politically suspect BHRHA advisory
opinions for its asylum determinations. 179
In the United States the district director grants refugees asylum in
his or her discretion. 80 In Canada, however, refugees have a right to
remain there.8 ' The United States has two separate refugee standards:
one for refugees qualifying for a discretionary grant asylum, another for
refugees having a right to withholding of deportation. Each standard has
a separate burden of proof.1 82 As a result of having two standards or
classes of refugees, a refugee in the United States who is not granted
asylum has the higher burden of proving a clear probability of persecu-
tion to qualify for country specific withholding of deportation.'8 3 In con-
trast, Canada has a unitary standard of refugee status with one definition
and one burden of proof."8 4
V. PROPOSAL
The United States Congress should eliminate district director's dis-
cretion in granting asylum. The United States should guarantee all aliens
176. Compare supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text with supra notes 115-17 and ac-
companying text.
177. Compare supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text with supra notes 136-39 and ac-
companying text.
178. Compare supra notes 11-16 with supra notes 98-102.
179. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
180. Supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text discuss the exception when asylum is not
discretionary and denial is required.
181. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discusses the few exceptions when a
"Convention refugee" may be deported).
182. See supra notes 8 and 71 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 97 and 108 and accompanying text.
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who prove that they are refugees under 8 U.S.C. section 1101(42) and the
Handbook the right to remain in the United States, unless they endanger
the lives of the community or another country grants them asylum. The
burden of proof should be that set down in Cardoza-Fonseca (a well-
founded fear of persecution). Congressional legislation which includes
the aforementioned suggestions would guarantee nondiscriminatory de-
terminations of asylum applications because it would bar immigration
adjudicators from basing the granting or denial of asylum on BHRHA
advisory opinions. It would also eliminate the dual standard for deter-
mining refugee status under 8 U.S.C. section 1158(a) and 8 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1253(h). Furthermore, the proposed legislation would effectuate
Protocol policies of nonrefoulement, assimilation and naturalization of
refugees, and Congressional intent to conform to the Protocol by guaran-
teeing refugees the right to remain in the United States. Presently, when
the district director denies asylum to refugees who cannot prove a "clear
probability of persecution," they face deportation to the country of perse-
cution. The case of Roberto G. illustrates the reality of deporting a
refugee185
Another effect of the proposed legislation would arise under the
Foreign Assistance Act.' 6 The Department of State would find it diffi-
cult to prove to Congress each year that a recipient of United States mili-
tary aid is not engaged in gross violations of human rights if
simultaneously the United States is granting asylum to thousands of that
country's refugees.
The United States could best fulfill its international obligations by
eliminating the clear probability standard. Neither the Protocol nor the
Handbook imposes the harsh clear probability of persecution standard
for country specific withholding of deportation. If the United States
were to combine the two classes of refugee status, then it would have to
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of thousands of new refu-
gees rather than deport them to their country of origin.187 This might be
185. Van Der Hout, supra note 1, at 72.
186. 22 U.S.C. § 2304.
187. In 1986 a total of 601,708 persons immigrated to the United States. I.N.S. YrAR-
BOOK, supra note 31, at 4. However, of all 11,241 asylum cases granted or denied in 1986, only
3,359 or 29.9% were granted. Id. at 48. Even assuming that 100% of asylum applications
were granted, this is but a small percentage (1.8%) of all immigrants. The true percentage
would be slightly higher because an application can include more than one individual. Id. at
49. On the other hand, if United States refugee law fairly granted all refugees the right to
remain in the United States, perhaps there would be a flood of applications. In that case, the
public might perceive the refugee standards as too lax and demand tighter restrictions as oc-
cured in Canada. For a brief discussion of Canada's new refugee legislation aimed at tighten-
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an incentive for the United States to redress its part in the cause of refu-
gees' fleeing civil war or repressive military regimes supported by the
United States.
Finally, United States refugee law would be more fair if the Attor-
ney General would change 8 C.F.R. sections 208.8(f)(1)(v) and (vi).
These provisions require the district director to deny asylum if he or she
believes that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the
United States or if the district director has reasonable grounds to regard
the alien as a danger to the security of the United States. A more just
regulation would require the district director to prove, rather than
merely believe, that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime
or is a security threat to the United States. Otherwise, partisan politics
on the district director's part could exclude genuine refugees.
VI. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF CANADA'S NEW
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION
On July 22, 1988, the Canadian Governor General passed two bills
(C-55 and C-84) which alter and restrict the system of refugee determina-
tions in Canada without changing statutory or case law regarding the
definition, standard or burden of proof for a refugee. 18' The new legisla-
tion, expected to go into effect on January 1, 1989, is the result of recent
outcries over perceived abuses of Canada's immigration system. 18 9 The
main problem with the new legislation is that otherwise qualified refugees
may now be denied entry and the opportunity to assert a refugee claim if
they arrive at Canadian borders from a "safe country."'19 0 The legisla-
tion directs the Canadian Cabinet to create a list of safe countries which
comply with Article 33 (the nonrefoulement provision) of the Conven-
tion.19 The safe country does not have to be a signatory of the Conven-
tion to be included on the list.192
If the Canadian Cabinet includes the United States on the list, then
any alien who asserts a refugee claim at the Canadian border, after pass-
ing through the United States, can be returned to the United States. At
that point the alien would be handed over to the INS and subject to
United States refugee standards. The only factor the Canadian govern-
ing up their refugee law see 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 30, at 785 (Aug. 8, 1988) and
infra section VI.
188. See INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 6, at 785-86.
189. Id. at 786.
190. Id. at 787.
191. The only exception would be aliens in transit from one country to another, Id.
192. Id.
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ment must show to deny the alien entry is that one of the safe countries
will allow the alien to return' 93 A conflict seems probable because in
response to the recent legislation, the INS declared that, "[o]nce an ille-
gal alien is admitted by Canada for an inquiry he has no right to reenter
the United States.... You can't return illegal aliens back to a country
where they were previously illegal. You deport them to their homeland.
We wouldn't take them back."' 94
The safe country provision will likely face attacks on constitutional
grounds. These attacks would rely on Singh v. ME, 195 which held that
the Canadian Constitution covers everyone whether at a port of entry or
inside Canada.' 96 In addition, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms guarantees as substantive rights the rights to life, liberty, security
of person, and the right not to be deprived of those rights except in ac-
cordance with fundamental justice.197 Thus, critics of the safe country
provision argue that it unconstitutionally deprives aliens of their substan-
tive rights under the Canadian Constitution and the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.' 98
VII. CONCLUSION
Prejudice can infect any refugee determination system through
either the law or the process that implements the law. This Note has
focused on Canadian and United States refugee law and not their process
of implementation. Compared with Canadian refugee law and the Proto-
col, United States refugee law fails to offer adequate protection to refu-
gees. The United States recognizes refugees as people who have left their
country of normal residence owing to a well-founded fear of persecution.
Presently the United States grants refugees no absolute protection from
deportation to the country where they fear persecution. The United
States failure to adequately protect refugees of all nationalities is not
present practice in Canada and is contrary to United States' obligations
as a signatory of the Protocol. United States law should guarantee any
qualified refugee the right to remain in the United States. This would
help eliminate the practice of granting asylum to refugees who serve to
support the administration's political goals at the expense of humanita-
rian concerns. Protecting refugees is humanitarian in nature, and Article
193. Id.
194. Id. quoting Duke Austin, INS spokesman in Washington, D.C.
195. 58 N.R. 1 (1985).
196. Id.
197. See INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 6, at 788.
198. Id."
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3 of the Convention guarantees that protection whether the refugee is
fleeing a country supported by the Soviet Union or a United States
backed military dictatorship.
